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For Troubled Youth-Help, Not Jail
By Stephen J Skuris*
"[T]here's the King's Messenger. He's in prison now, being pun-
ished; and the trial doesn't even begin till next Wednesday; and of
course the crime comes last of all."
"Suppose he never commits the crime?" said Alice.
"That would be all the better, wouldn't it?" the Queen said.'
Like the punishment given the King's Messenger, our juvenile
courts punish troubled youngsters who have committed no crime: the
incorrigibles, the ungovernables, the truants, the runaways. The juve-
nile courts maintain broad grounds of jurisdiction allowing judicial in-
tervention into matters of antisocial, but noncriminal, conduct on the
assumption that with a court's guidance and treatment an erring child
can grow to be a productive and useful citizen. Little evidence exists,
however, to indicate that children have benefited from this juvenile
court intervention.
2
This Note examines juvenile court jurisdiction over noncriminal
behavior. An overview of the history and philosophy of the juvenile
court system provides a foundation for a discussion of both the
problems attendant to the court's jurisdiction over these "status offend-
ers" and the trend toward elimination of this jurisdiction. The Note
sets forth alternative methods of dealing with noncriminal youth and
concludes that states should act now to substitute voluntary social ser-
vices and mediation for the responsibility that presently rests with the
juvenile justice system. The primary focus of the Note is on California
law as an example of what can be done in the future to make nation-
wide changes in the laws governing juveniles.
History and Philosophy
An analysis of the history and philosophy of the juvenile court
system is important to a full understanding of the jurisdiction of the
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courts over noncriminal youth and the increasing attack upon that ju-
risdiction.
Parens Patriae
The origins of the juvenile court system can be traced to the feudal
days of England when the crown, through an inquisition or inquest
after death,3 supervised the estates of surviving minors. The theory by
which the courts of chancery asserted guardianship over these minors
was termedparens patriae.4 The doctrine ofparenspatriae allowed the
state to act in locoparentis5 for all minors requiring its care and protec-
tion. This concept, that the state is the ultimate parent of all depen-
dents within its borders, underlies the philosophy of our juvenile court
system.
The courts' exercise of jurisdiction had become extremely broad
by the mid-seventeenth century, assuming guardianship over minors to
protect them from personal injury and loss of property.6 The courts
provided for the care, protection, discipline, and reform of minors who
required such supervision. This equity jurisdiction over minors, by
then an integral part of the English system of government, passed to the
United States upon the establishment of courts of law and equity in the
American states. 7
3. This was known as the inquisitio post mortem. When a tenant died seised of prop-
erty with an infant heir, wardship was provided by the King to acquire the benefits of tenure
and livery. See In re Daedler, 194 Cal. 320, 324, 228 P. 467, 469 (1924).
4. Parens patriae literally means parent or father of the country. "In England, the
King. In the United States, the state as sovereign-referring to the sovereign power of a
guardianship over persons under disability." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1269 (4th ed. rev.
1968). The term parenspatriae was used to explain the investiture of the court with jurisdic-
tion over the person and estates of minors in Eyre v. Shaftsbury, 24 Eng. Rep. 659, 2 P.
Wins. 103 (1722). For a study of the history ofparenspatriae as it relates to the juvenile
court system, see Rendleman, Parens Patriae." From Chancery to the Juvenile Court, 23
S.C.L. REV. 205 (1971).
5. This doctrine became an integral part of the juvenile proceeding in the United
States beginning with Exparte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1839).
6. See generally Cowls v. Cowls, 8 Ill. 393 (3 Gilm. 435) (1846). In Cowls, the court
stated: "The power of the court of chancery to interfere with and control, not only the
estates but the persons and custody of all minors within the limits of its jurisdiction, is of
very ancient origin, and cannot now be questioned. This is a power which must necessarily
exist somewhere in every well-regulated society, and more especially in a republican govern-
ment. . . . A jurisdiction thus extensive, and liable as we have seen, to enter into the domes-
tic relations of every family in the community, is necessarily of a very delicate, and often of
a very embarrassing nature; and yet its exercise is indispensable in every well-governed soci-
ety; It is indispensably necessary to protect the persons and preserve the property of those
who are unable to protect and take care of themselves." d. at 395-96 (3 Gilm. at 437).




The present juvenile court concept developed further amidst the
social revolution of the nineteenth century. Industrialism and immi-
gration brought thousands of people to cities, resulting in overcrowd-
ing, increased crime, and the disruption of family life. Truancy and
delinquency rose rapidly. Civic-minded men and women became con-
cerned about the effect that the city, street life, and exposure to tobacco,
alcohol, and pornography had upon children.8 An additional concern
was the brutalization of youth by the criminal justice process.9 In re-
sponse to these problems, social and legal changes were sought by early
reformers, known as "child savers,"' 1 who believed children were to be
cared for, educated, and protected.I
The first major reform was the opening of the New York House of
Refuge in 182512 by Quaker reformers.13 The House of Refuge offered
food, shelter, and education to the homeless and destitute of New York
and, for the first time, removed juvenile offenders from the prison com-
pany of adults. This intervention into the lives of children and the spe-
cialized treatment afforded juvenile offenders was an effort to prevent
predelinquent youths 14 from becoming criminals.' 5 These reformers
8. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 2.
9. Id. See, e.g., S. GLUECK & E. GLUECK, 1000 JUVENILE DELINQUENTS: THEIR
TREATMENT BY COURT AND CLINIC (2d ed. 1965); Article, Persons in Need of Supervision,
THE NEW YORKER, August 14, 1978, at 55.
10. A. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS (1969). The child savers included people such as
Jane Addams, Enoch C. Wines, William Letchworth, Charles H. Cooley, and Louise de
Koven Bowen.
11. Underlying the reform efforts was the doctrine ofparenspatriae. See Expare Ah
Peen, 51 Cal. 280 (1876); Exparte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1839).
12. The enabling legislation for the House of Refuge was the Act of Mar. 29, 1824, ch.
126, 1824 N.Y. Laws 110. See generaly Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspec-
live, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187 (1969).
13. See generally S. JAMES, A PEOPLE AMONG PEOPLE: QUAKER BENEVOLENCE IN
18TH CENTURY AMERICA (1963).
14. The House of Refuge attempted to deal with minors who displayed antisocial con-
duct or committed minor offenses, in an effort to reform children who were not yet true
criminals. This objective of crime and delinquency prevention still permeates the juvenile
justice system today.
15. A report by the Society for the Prevention of Pauperism in New York City called
for "the rescue of children from a future of crime and degradation": " 'Every person that
frequents the out-streets of this city, must be forcibly struck with the ragged and uncleanly
appearance, the vile language, and the idle and miserable habits of great numbers of chil-
dren, most of whom are of an age suitable for schools, or for some useful employment. The
parents of these children, are, in all probability, too poor, or too degenerate, to provide them
with clothing fit for them to be seen in at School; and know not where to place them in order
that they may find employment, or be better cared for. Accustomed, in many instances, to
witness at home nothing in the way of example, but what is degrading; early taught to ob-
serve intemperance, and to hear obscene and profane language without disgust; obliged to
beg, and even encouraged to acts of dishonesty, to satisfy the wants induced by the indolence
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sought to reaffirm the traditional values of parental authority and edu-
cation, as well as the values of rural life. 16
By the latter half of the nineteenth century, a definite effort was
under way to establish a separate system of justice for juveniles. 17 This
effort culminated in 1899 in the institution by the Illinois legislature of
the first separate juvenile court system in the nation.'8 Jurisdiction was
removed from the state's adult courts because of the belief that chil-
dren's deviant behavior should be regarded as misguided and errant
rather than criminal. Under this new legislation, the state could inter-
vene, not as a punitive force, but as a protector of the child.19 Rehabili-
tation of the juvenile was the courts' main concern because children
were assumed to be malleable and therefore salvageable. 20 The courts
were not to be concerned with the guilt or innocence of the child but
with "[w]hat he is, how has he become what he is, and what had best be
done in his interest and in the interest of the state to save him from a
downward career." 2' This philosophy doubtless was idealistic, assum-
ing that children are largely the product of their environment and in
of their parents-what can be expected, but that such children will, in due time, become
responsible to the laws for crimes .... Can it be consistent with real justice, that delin-
quents of this character, should be consigned to the infamy and severity of punishments,
which must inevitably tend to perfect the work of degradation, to sink them still deeper in
corruption, to deprive them of their remaining sensibility to the shame of exposure, and
establish them in all hardihood of daring and desperate villainy? Is it possible that a Chris-
tian community can lend its sanction to such a process without any effort to rescue and to
save?' " Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform- An HistoricalPerspectiye, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187, 1189
(1969) (quoting SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF PAUPERISM IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK,
REPORT ON THE SUBJECT OF ERECTING A HOUSE OF REFUGE FOR VAGRANT AND DE-
PRAVED YOUNG PEOPLE, reprintedin SOCIETY FOR THE REFORMATION OF JUVENILE DELIN-
QUENTS, DOCUMENTS RELATIVE TO THE HOUSE OF REFUGE 13 (N. Hart ed. 1832)).
16. See Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 114 (1909). Importantly, this
is still being done today in the form of state juvenile camps and ranches. See CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE §§ 654, 730 (West Supp. 1979); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 66 (West
Supp. 1979).
17. See Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187,
1221-31 (1969).
18. Act of April 21, 1899, 1899 Ill. Laws 131. The original juvenile court included most
of the procedures recognized as distinctive features of juvenile courts today. Hearings were
informal and private, records were confidential, and children had separate detention facili-
ties and personnel. See Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104 (1909).
19. Underlying the juvenile court system is the doctrine ofparenspatriae, the assump-
tion being that the status of youth is different from the status of adulthood-youth status
carries with it special protections.
20. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 22; see also In re Herrera, 23 Cal. 2d
206, 213, 143 P.2d 345, 348 (1943).
21. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARv. L. REV. 104, 119-20 (1909). It was this princi-
ple which was declared in the Act of 1899 under which the Juvenile Court of Cook County,
Illinois, was opened. "Why is it not just and proper to treat juvenile offenders, as we deal
with the neglected children, as a wise and merciful father handles his own child whose errors
are not discoverable by the authorities? ...[T]o take him in charge, not so much as to
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their formative years can benefit from rehabilitative treatment. These
lofty ideals of the reformers, supported by the doctrine of parens pa-
triae, were incorporated into the growing number of state juvenile
court acts.
22
Jurisdiction Over Noncriminal Youths
The reformers of the nineteenth century neither attempted to limit
juvenile court jurisdiction nor to distinguish between criminal and non-
criminal children. Rehabilitative goals were so heavily stressed that the
courts were not concerned with whether the child had committed any
criminal wrong.23 As a result of the emphasis upon these goals, juris-
diction of the juvenile court was not limited to criminal conduct. In-
deed, juvenile codes often defined, and continue to define, "status
offenses"-instances of antisocial but noncriminal behavior 24-in lan-
guage so broad that conceivably every child in the United States could
be brought within the juvenile court's jurisdiction25 if a judge so de-
punish as to reform, not to degrade but to uplift, not to crush but to develop, not to make
him a criminal but a worthy citizen.
"And it is this thought--the thought that a child who has begun to go wrong, who is
incorrigible, who has broken a law or an ordinance, is to be taken in hand by the state, not
as an enemy but as a protector, as the ultimate guardian, because either the unwillingness or
inability of the natural parents to guide it toward good citizenship has compelled the inter-
vention of public authorities." Id. at 107.
22. By 1925, juvenile courts existed in all but two states. Today every state has a juve-
nile court system. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 3. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 202(a) (West Supp. 1979) which reads: "The purpose of this chapter is to secure for each
minor under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court such care and guidance, preferably in his
own home, as will serve the spiritual, emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the minor
and the best interests of the state .... " See also In re William M., 3 Cal. 3d 16, 473 P.2d
737, 89 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1970); In re A.J., 274 Cal. App. 2d 199, 78 Cal. Rptr. 880 (1969).
23. Subsequent amendments to the acts brought cases of dependency, truancy, neglect,
unruliness, and incorrigibility under one jurisdiction. See Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23
HARV. L. REV. 104, 107-11 (1909).
24. Juveniles are termed status offenders because it is their state of being, their alleged
incorrigibility or unruliness, rather than a criminal offense, which brings them before the
courts. Their only offense against society is doing something that would not be legally pro-
hibited if done by an adult. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 601 (West Supp. 1979).
25. ASSEMBLY REPORT, supra note 2, at 21. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at
25; E.S.G. v. State, 447 S.W.2d 225, 232 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1969). See generally DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 10, § 901(7) (1975) (so as to endanger the morals or health of self or others); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-2301(8)(B) (Supp. 1978) (in need of care or rehabilitation); LA. REV. STAT.
§ 13:1570 (West Supp. 1979) (injurious to own welfare).
Even before the establishment of the first juvenile court, the Illinois Supreme Court in
People v. Turner, 55 Ill. 280 (1870), expressed concern with "catch all" statutes. The court
there addressed the constitutionality of a statute permitting commitment school for anyone
under twenty-one who was vagrant, destitute of parental care, or growing up in idleness or
vice. The court struck down the statute, concluding that such a restraint upon noncriminal
behavior amounted to tyranny and oppression.
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sired. The basic philosophy supporting this expansive approach was
that the court should intervene on behalf of every child in need of help,
for whatever reason and however that need manifested itself.
Based on this nineteenth century philosophy, every state currently
has extended its juvenile court's power to intervene in cases involving
status offenses. 26 Status offense jurisdiction typically covers a wide
spectrum of conduct, including truancy, running away from home, in-
corrigibility, disobedience, and being in danger of leading an idle, dis-
solute, lewd, or immoral life.2 7 These juvenile codes, however,
generally fall short of the specificity that would allow a minor to deter-
mine what behavior falls within the prohibitions of the statute,28 and
26. All fifty-onejuvenile codes, including the District of Columbia, extend the jurisdic-
tion of the juvenile courts to include not only dependent and neglected children and those
who violate the criminal law, but also juveniles who exhibit certain noncriminal behavior.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 601 (West Supp. 1979) reads: "Any person under the age of 18
years who persistently or habitually refuses to obey the reasonable and proper orders or
directions of his parents, guardians, or custodian, or who is beyond the control of such per-
son. . . is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court which may adjudge such a person to
be a ward of the court." See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-703 (Smith-Hurd 1972);
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 712, 713 (McKinney Supp. 1978); VA. CODE § 16.1-241 (Supp. 1979).
27. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 601 contained such terminology before it was
amended in 1975 to delete "or who from any cause is in danger of leading an idle, dissolute,
lewd, or immoral life." Cal. Stat. 1975, ch. 192 § I; ch. 1183, § 2.
28. See generally Gesicki v. Oswald, 336 F. Supp. 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), affid, 406 U.S.
913 (1972). Due process also requires that statutes provide adequate standards to prevent
arbitrary and capricious enforcement. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108
(1972); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972).
Vaguely written statutes, when applicable to adults, have been held invalid, as they
create an unrrasonable restraint upon personal liberty. The United States Supreme Court
has addressed the problem of vaguely written statutes on numerous occasions. The general
rule is that a statute is violative of the essentials of due process when it either forbids or
requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that persons of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. Connally v. General Constr.
Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926); Wheeler v. Goodman, 306 F. Supp. 58 (W.D.N.C. 1969). See
generally Note, Statutory Vagueness in Juvenile Law: The Supreme Court and Mattiello P.
Connecticut, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 143 (1969). Yet statutes that label children as incorrigible
or wayward generally have been held to be constitutional. See In re Daniel R., 274 Cal.
App. 2d 749, 79 Cal. Rptr. 247 (1969); District of Columbiav. B.J.R., 332 A.2d 58 (D.C. Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1016 (1975); In re Napier, 532 P.2d 423 (Okla. Sup. Ct. 1975):
Blondhiem v. State, 84 Wash. 2d 874, 529 P.2d 1096 (1975). Cf. Gesicki v. Oswald, 336 F.
Supp. 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aft'd, 406 U.S. 913 (1972) (statute directed at minors unconstitu-
tionally vague).
The explanation for this difference in treatment between adults and children is usually
couched in terms of the doctrine ofparenspatriae. The statutes are not punishing juveniles,
but allowing the court to act in what it believes to be in the best interest of the child in order
to produce a responsible citizen. See People v. Deibert, 117 Cal. App. 2d 410, 415, 256 P.
355, 358 (1953). Notwithstanding the highly enlightened motives of the juvenile laws, it
appears that many juvenile behavior laws may be unconstitutionally vague and violative of
due process. In light of the Supreme Court's grant of most due process safeguards to juve-
nile delinquents, it follows that noncriminal juveniles should not be forced to defend against
[Vol. 31
often encompass a virtual "manual of undesirable youthful behav-
ior." 2
9
Until recently, most states included such broad language defining
jurisdiction over noncriminal behavior in the same statutory provision
that controlled criminal behavior. All deviant juvenile behavior was
classified as "delinquent. °30 Recently, however, a number of states
have divided juvenile misconduct into separate categories, one for
criminal behavior and one for status offenses.3 ' A youngster who com-
mits a status offense may be labeled a "person in need of supervision"
(PINS),3 2 "ungovernable," "incorrigible," an "unruly child," and the
like.
These statutory attempts to distinguish criminal from noncriminal
youths presumably were an attempt to prevent the stigma of "delin-
quency" from attaching to status offenders and to increase the benefits
of court involvement in the lives of status offenders. The actual impact
of these semantic distinctions, however, has been minimal as the dis-
tinctions are not accompanied by any differences in treatment. Courts
still are allowed to assert jurisdiction over youths who have committed
no crime, but merely are unable to adjust to difficult family environ-
ments, to handle the pressures of school, or to cope with the demands
of today's youth culture.33 In general, these status offenders are treated
identically to juveniles who violate the criminal law. Both can be ad-
judged wards of the court and placed outside their homes in private
institutions, training schools, foster homes, or juvenile camps and
ranches.34 Consequently, status offenders are likely to bear the same
vaguely written laws. This is especially valid since in practice there is little difference be-
tween the treatment of the status offender and the juvenile criminal. See generally Mc-
Keiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
29. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 22.
30. See Note, The Dilemma of the Uniquely Juvenile Offender, 14 WM. & MARY L. REV.
386, 388 (1972). See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 §§ 901(7), 921(1) (1975); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 31-5-7-4.1 (Burns 1978); S.C. CODE § 43-17-10 (1978).
31. In the 1960s, California and New York rewrote their juvenile laws to separate non-
criminal offenders from criminal offenders by creating a new noncriminal category in addi-
tion to the classifications of neglect and delinquency. Today, twenty-five states have created
separate categories for status offenders. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 601 (West
Supp. 1979); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 712 (McKinney Supp. 1978).
32. Also referred to as CHINO, CINS, MINS, YINS, and JINS.
33. See Bayh, Juveniles and the Law: An Introduction, 12 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 5
(1974).
34. Some states place restrictions on the disposition alternatives available to the juve-
nile court judge for status offenders. For the alternatives available to a judge in California,
see notes 42-68 & accompanying text infra. See generally D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2313 (Supp.
1978); N.Y. FAM. CT. AT § 754 (McKinney Supp. 1978); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-32
(1974).
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stigma as criminal delinquents. 35 These efforts at separation, although
laudable as a step toward more effective rehabilitation of juvenile sta-
tus offenders, realistically create little more than a distinction without a
difference. Despite the original hopes, any distinction in the juvenile
codes between criminal and noncriminal youths has failed to affect the
treatment that noncriminal youths currently receive.
The Decriminalization Trend
The mid-1970s witnessed a widespread trend in the juvenile justice
system toward decriminalizing status offenses. This trend, which went
well beyond changes in statutory definitions, was prompted, at least in
part, by the passage of the federal Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention Act of 1974.36 The purpose of the Act was to help states,
local communities, and public and private agencies develop and con-
duct effective delinquency prevention programs, to divert more
juveniles from the juvenile justice process, and to provide alternatives
to traditional detention and correctional facilities. 37 The Act provided
for grants of federal funds to carry out these congressional directives,
38
which directives were based on a recognition that a large percentage of
youths held in correctional institutions were not guilty of any crime,
but were brought into the system merely because of their age.
39
In support of the Act, professionals argued that detaining non-
criminal youths in the same facilities as criminal offenders and subject-
ing them to the same treatment can affect their self-conceptions
sufficiently to shape future conduct along more criminal lines.40 They
believed that the program for status offenders should offer treatment
Federal funds are available to finance separate facilities for nondelinquents. See 42
U.S.C.A. § 5711 (West Supp. 1979).
35. See notes 72-84 & accompanying text infra.
36. Pub. L. No. 93-415, 88 Stat. 1109 (1974) (current version at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5601-
5751 (1977 & Supp. 1979)). The Act deals with both criminal and noncriminal youth. The
Act was developed during a four-year investigation conducted by the United States Senate
Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency and was supported by citizens groups
and bipartisan majorities in Congress. The Senate vote was 88-1 and the House vote 329-20.
37. See 42 U.S.C. § 5602 (1976). The Act also created a National Institute for Juvenile
Justice with the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration's National Institute of Law
Enforcement and Criminal Justice to serve as a center for national efforts in juvenile delin-
quency evaluation, data collection, research, and training. Id. §§ 5651-5661.
38. Id. §§ 5631-5633.
39. "Nearly 40% of the children brought to the attention of the juvenile justice system
have committed no criminal act, in adult terms, and are involved simply because they are
juveniles." S. REP. No. 93-1011, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1974), reprintedin [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5287 [hereinafter cited as CONG. & AD. NEWS]. See also ABA-UA,
JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT, Noncriminal Misbehavior 1-2 (Tent. Draft 1977)
[hereinafter cited as STANDARDS].
40. See generally CONG. & AD. NEWS, supra note 39, at 5288; L. RICHETTE, THE
THROWAWAY CHILDREN (1969).
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different from that afforded criminal offenders and that rehabilitation,
not punishment, should be emphasized. The placement of status of-
fenders in secure facilities with criminal offenders was not considered
to be conducive to this rehabilitative goal.
4 '
The California Response
California, considered to be in the vanguard of juvenile justice re-
form, was one of the first states to respond to the problems of the status
offender.42 In 1976, the California Legislature approved Assembly Bill
3121, a broad revision of the juvenile court system, which, in part,
amended the Welfare and Institutions Code to deinstitutionalize the
status offender.43 The revised Welfare and Institutions Code section
207 mandates that status offenders be confined to non-secure institu-
tions only.44 Minors who commit status offenses in California no
longer are treated as if the public needs to be protected from them.
In response to the directives of the legislature, California proba-
tion departments attempted to establish non-secure facilities, crisis res-
olution homes, and sheltered care facilities as authorized by the
Welfare and Institutions Code.45 More family counseling and crisis in-
tervention services were provided.4 6 This trend away from formal
41. See notes 82-84 & accompanying text infra.
42. New York also was among the first states to respond to the trend to end the inap-
propriate institutionalization of young people. By 1977, New York had closed state training
schools to the placement of "persons in need of supervision" (PINS) and had substituted a
variety of other noninstitutional programs. As stated by Governor Hugh L. Carey: "We
established small group residences in communities, family foster care, and non-residential
services for youngsters who could remain with their families by virtue of the added help and
services. We recognized the need to nurture the good qualities of our youth, and provide the
kind of environment that would enable them to become responsible, contributing members
of society." Carey, .4 Positive Perspective, TRIAL, January 1979, at 33.
43. The initial amendments to the juvenile laws placed the prohibition on secured
placement in § 507 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. A cleanup bill which followed AB
3121 called for the placement of the prohibition in § 207 of that code. Section 207(b) reads:
"[N]o minor shall be detained in any jail, lockup, juvenile hall, or other secure facility who
is taken into custody solely upon the ground that he is a person described by Section 601 or
adjudged to be such or made a ward of the juvenile court solely upon that ground .... If
any such minor ... is detained, he shall be detained in a sheltered-care facility or crisis
resolution home as provided in Section 654, or in a non-secure facility provided for in subdi-
vision (a), (b), (c), or (d) of Section 727." CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 207(b) (West Supp.
1979).
44. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 207(b) (West Supp. 1979).
45. See id. §§ 654, 727 (West Supp. 1979). Each county has developed its own proce-
dure, and in some cases unique programs, to carry out the intent of the legislature. Many
jurisdictions sought to provide facilities which were a bona fide alternative to secure deten-
tion at juvenile hall, for example, the Perry Place program in Alameda County. See notes
95-109 & accompanying text infra. Other jurisdictions, such as San Francisco, merely re-
moved the locks from some of the cottages at juvenile hall.
46. Whether AB 3121 encouraged this shift to increased services, or if it simply came
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court proceedings and detention and toward more informal community
services generally was supported.
47
Despite the laudable goals of the legislature and the efforts of pro-
bation departments, problems developed. 48 Of these problems, the one
that received the most attention arose from concern for those status
offenders who were not amenable to informal services in a non-secure
setting. This concern surfaced in the opinion in In Re Ronald S.49
Ronald, a thirteen year old, was adjudged a ward of the court under
California Welfare and Institutions Code section 601.50 He was sent to
a non-secure crisis center under an order to remain there, but promptly
left the same day. Ronald's conduct apparently was not unusual. Jus-
tice Gardner of the California Court of Appeal wrote:
601's are often somewhat irresponsible, not to say nomadic .... An
immediate result of the 1976 amendment [AB 3121] was that while
authorities were doing the preliminary paperwork at the front door
of a non-secure home for a runaway, the runaway was simply run-
ning away again out the back door. Placing a runaway mi a non-
secure environment is something of an exercise in futility.-'
Justice Gardner, although noting that "it may seem ridiculous to place
a runaway in a non-secure setting,"'52 concluded that the decision to
place runaways in such facilities had been made by the legislature,
leaving him no alternative but to follow the legislative mandate.
5 3
Justice Gardner's point of view, reflecting the dissatisfaction of
many juvenile court judges with the liberal placement policies imple-
mented by the 1976 changes in the California Welfare and Institutions
Code,54 was shared by law enforcement officials and by many par-
along after the fact, noting the trend to remove status offenders from the juvenile court
jurisdiction, is an open question. In any case, more juveniles are now being served through
community based programs than prior to AB 3121. See CALIFORNIA YOUTH AUTHORITY,
AB 3121 IMPACT EVALUATION 24-25 (1978).
47. Id.
48. For example, the legislation did not specify who was to be responsible for programs
for status offenders and what kinds of services were to be provided.
49. 69 Cal. App. 3d 866, 138 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1977). As Justice Gardner of the Califor-
nia Court of Appeal noted: "[olne small cloud, the size of a delinquent child's hand immedi-
ately appeared on the judicial horizon." Id. at 872, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
50. See note 26 supra for text of section 601.
51. 69 Cal. App. 3d at 872, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 391-92.
52. Id. at 873, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 392.
53. In Justice Gardner's words, "[als the law now stands, the legislature has said that if
a 601 wants to run, let him run." Id. at 874, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 392.
54. "If the juvenile court is to be saddled with responsibility for 601's, it must also be
afforded the tools and authority to handle those cases." Id. at 875, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 393.
Without the power to put orders and decisions into effect, there seems little reason to devote
judicial resources to adjudication and placement.
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ents.5 5 Parents were alarmed by situations in which they would receive
a phone call from the police concerning their runaway son or daughter.
Often, before the parents could arrive at the police station to retrieve
their child, the child would have left of his or her own accord 56 because
the police had no power to hold the child.57 Police and probation of-
ficers argued that the power to hold status offenders was essential to
solving the problems of noncriminal youth.
58
In 1978, the legislature responded by enacting Assembly Bill 958,59
which provides limited circumstances in which a minor can be detained
in a secure facility. Under the provisions of the bill, a juvenile can be
held for up to twelve hours for a warrant check,60 and up to twenty-
four hours to locate the minor's parents or guardian and to arrange the
return of the minor to them.6' Proponents of the bill saw it as a neces-
sity for law enforcement and probation personnel, reasoning that if the
court is to be responsible for status offenders it must be given the au-
thority to handle them.
62
The bill was not without its opponents. 63 One critic argued that
55. Interview with Peter Bull, Director of the National Center for Youth Law, San
Francisco Office, in San Francisco (Jan. 10, 1979).
56. Id.
57. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 207(b) (West Supp. 1979) (amended 1978) provides:
"[N]o minor shall be detained in any jail, lockup, or juvenile hall, or other secure facility
who is taken into custody solely on the ground that he is a person described by Section 601
." See also N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr §§ 718, 720 (McKinney Supp. 1978).
58. "Police argued that if they had the power to hold juvenile status offenders, at least
for a few days, this would give the juveniles time to realize the realities of their situation,
and then they would be more receptive to the services available." Interview with Peter Bull,
Director of the National Center for Youth Law, San Francisco Office, in San Francisco (Jan.
10, 1979).
59. AB 958 was introduced in the California legislature regular session by Assembly-
man Julian Dixon. Among the changes worked by AB 958 was the addition of subsection
(c) to Welfare and Institutions Code § 207, which sets forth limited circumstances under
which a status offender may be retained for a specified period of time.
60. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 207(c)(1) (West Supp. 1979). Such detention is per-
mitted where "the arresting officer or probation officer has cause to believe that. . . wants,
warrants, or holds exist." Id.
61. Id. § 207(c)(2). Section 207(c)(3) permits a detention pending location of parents or
guardian which may be extended to up to seventy-two hours if the minor's parents or guard-
ian are not California residents and if "the distance of the parents or guardian from the
county of custody, difficulty in locating the parents or guardian, or difficulty in locating
resources necessary to provide for the return of the minor" makes earlier return unreasona-
bly difficult. Id. § 207(c)(3).
62. See In re Ronald S., 69 Cal. App. 3d 866, 138 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1977). "Certainly not
all 601's need to be placed in secure facilities. However, some do and in these cases the
juvenile court judge must have the authority to detain in a secure facility-if 601's are to
remain in the juvenile court." Id. at 875, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 393.
63. See San Francisco Examiner, Sept. 2, 1978, at 6, col. 1.
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"[t]he crime we are incarcerating people for is being a minor, ' 64 and
another considered the bill as allowing "police to hold a youngster for
no reason.
65
AB 958 granted police the authority to keep status offenders under
lock and key, but it does not require such action. As a practical matter,
the authority to detain is rarely used. Numerous counties have decided
not to make use of the new law, 66 perhaps because of the costs in-
volved 67 or because they have developed other successful programs for
handling these juveniles. 68 AB 958 could have slowed the trend toward
deinstitutionalizing status offenders which began in California with As-
sembly Bill 3121 in 1976. The legislation has functioned, however,
more to appease those in opposition to deinstitutionalization than actu-
ally to affect the treatment of status offenders. Thus, California effec-
tively has taken long strides toward decriminalizing status offenses and
removing noncriminal youths from the institutional setting. The mech-
anisms for dealing with these youths operate largely outside the court-
room, yet status offenders remain subject to judicial intervention. The
following discussion details the need to extend this trend even further
than California has, by eliminating juvenile court jurisdiction over sta-
tus offenders.
The Need for Change in the Treatment of Status Offenders
Thousands of noncriminal juveniles have passed through the
traditional juvenile court system since its inception in 1899. These
juveniles have been counseled, placed on probation, put in foster
homes, made wards of the court, sent to juvenile camps, and even com-
mitted to juvenile institutions. Yet the evidence which exists does not
show that any significant number of these children have benefited.
69
64. Id. (quoting Senator Milton Marks).
65. Id. (quoting Senator Paul B. Carpenter).
66. For example, according to Lin Barrett of the Alameda County Probation Depart-
ment, the Alameda County Justice Council has recommended that the county not make use
of the new law. Joe Botka, Chief Probation Officer of the San Francisco Juvenile Court, has
stated San Francisco also is not taking advantage of the new provisions. San Francisco
Chronicle, Jan. 4, 1979, at 21, col. 4.
67. Section 207 as amended prohibits any 601 minor detained in juvenile hall from
coming into contact with a minor detained pursuant to § 602. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 207(d) (West Supp. 1979). While AB 958 appropriated $1,500,000 for allocation and dis-
bursement to local agencies for costs incurred in implementing the amended portions of
§ 207, the amount was not sufficient.
68. San Francisco Chronicle, Jan. 4, 1979, at 21, col. I. Alameda County, California,
for example, has developed Perry Place in Oakland and Harder Road in Hayward. For a
discussion of the Perry Place program, see notes 95-109 & accompanying text infra.
69. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 7; ASSEMBLY REPORT, supra note 2, at 31.
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According to the California Interim Committee on Criminal Proce-
dure:
No one can prove that truants who have become wards of the court
end up better educated than those who do not. No one can show that
promiscuous teenagers who are institutionalized have fewer illegiti-
mate children than those who are not. Nor can anyone show that
runaways who become wards of the court end up leading better ad-
justed lives than those who do not. Finally, no one can prove that
unruly, disobedient minors who come under court supervision end
up in prison less often than those who do not.
70
Notwithstanding the great hopes originally held for the juvenile
court system, it has not succeeded in significantly rehabilitating youths
or bringing justice to children. Instead, it has imposed what amounts
to punishment upon children who have committed no crime. This fail-
ure of juvenile courts to perform their rehabilitative and preventative
functions has led to increasing scrutiny of the jurisdiction of juvenile
courts over status offenders during the past decade.71 Not only has the
treatment of status offenders in the traditional justice system been less
effective than expected, it has created new problems both for the juve-
nile and for the judicial system.
The first major problem results from the psychological and socio-
logical effects of juvenile court proceedings on the youth involved. A
juvenile subjected to status offense jurisdiction is tried and subse-
quently treated in almost the same manner as a minor accused of a
crime.72 Because of this close association with criminal procedures, the
public tends to consider a juvenile to be "delinquent" if he or she has
been subject to either type of court proceeding.73 Despite the difference
in the degree of wrongdoing, generally no distinction is made between
the delinquent child who has committed a criminal act and the status
offender. As a result, the stigma of being a "delinquent" affects status
offenders as well as criminal offenders.
Perhaps the most serious result of this stigma is that the process
may be producing in children exactly those traits sought to be
avoided:
74
Official action may actually help to fix and perpetuate delinquency in
the child through a process in which the individual begins to think of
himself as delinquent and organizes his behavior accordingly. That
process itself is further reinforced by the effect of the labeling upon
the child's family, neighbors, teachers, and peers whose reactions
70. ASSEMBLY REPORT, supra note 2, at 30-31.
71. See, e.g., note 88 & accompanying text infra.
72. See ASSEMBLY REPORT, supra note 2, at 12-14.
73. See generally Paulsen, The Delinquency, Neglect, & Dependency Jurisdiction ofthe
Juvenile Court, in JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD 44, 45-46 (M. Rosenheim ed. 1962). Paulsen
maintains that stigma attaches anytime the juvenile appears before the court.
74. CONG. & AD. NEws, supra note 39, at 5288.
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communicate to the child in subtle ways a kind of expectation of
delinquent conduct.
7 5
The rationale of this theory, the "labeling hypothesis," 76 is that the
official classification of a misbehaving youth as delinquent has the ef-
fect of reinforcing deviant behavior. The social rejections77 caused by
the stigma often reinforce a negative self-image, persuading the juve-
nile that he or she cannot survive in normal society.78 The result is
continued delinquency-the "self-fulfilling prophecy.
79
Another aspect of the stigma affixed by involvement with the juve-
nile justice system lies in society's discrimination against such youths.
Despite statutes requiring the confidentiality of juvenile court
records,80 records are frequently released to police, armed forces, po-
tential employers, and government agencies. 81 In addition, employers
can obtain this information, legally or illegally, by asking for it on ap-
plications or in interviews. Thus, prior juvenile court involvement may
continue to stigmatize youths.
The second major problem area stems from the placement of non-
criminal minors in the same post-disposition detention facilities as mi-
nors who are in custody for criminal offenses.82 The criticism here is
that children who have committed no crime are exposed to some of the
worst representatives of their age group-murderers, thieves, and drug
addicts-at a time in their lives when they are most susceptible to peer
75. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUS-
TICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 80 (1967).
76. See generally R. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE (1957); E.
SCHUR, LABELING DEVIANT BEHAVIOR (1971). For a discussion of the validity of the label-
ing hypothesis, see Jensen, Delinquency and Adolescent Conceptions:. A Study ofthe Personal
Relevance of Infraction, 20 Soc. PROB. 84 (1972).
77. "This official stamp [of delinquency] may help to organize responses different from
those that would have arisen without the official action. The result is that the label has an
important effect upon how the individual is regarded by others. If official processing results
in an individual's being segregated with others so labeled, an additional push toward devi-
ant behavior may result. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 417.
78. Id. at 93.
79. Merton, The Self Fulfilling Prophecy, 8 ANTIOCH REV. 194 (1948).
80. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 781 (West Supp. 1979); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 166
(McKinney 1975). See also In re TNG, 4 Cal. 3d 767, 484 P.2d 981, 94 Cal. Rptr. 813
(1971); 55 Op. Att'y Gen. 175 (1972).
81. See generally Note, Juvenile Delinquents.- The Police, State Courts, and Individual-
ized Justice, 79 HARV. L. REV. 775, 784-85, 800 (1966). Cf PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A
FREE SOCIETY 87-88 (1967) (recognizing the need for privacy while simultaneously recom-
mending that reports be available to social agencies dealing with the juvenile when the in-
formation would not be injurious to him or her).
82. Some jurisdictions prohibit the detention of noncriminal youth with delinquent
youth, ie., Alaska, California, District of Columbia, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mex-
ico, and Oregon. For the law in California see note 59 supra. New York has imposed such a
prohibition by judicial decision. See In re Ellery C., 32 N.Y.2d 588, 300 N.E.2d 424 (1973).
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influences. 83 As noted by the California Interim Committee on Crimi-
nal Procedure, "[i]f any of them [status offenders] were ever on the
verge of committing a criminal act, they have been brought to the right
place for the final push."
84
The third major problem is the misuse of status offense jurisdiction
by parents to divest themselves of an undesirable or misbehaving child.
At their discretion, parents can bring their children to court, armed
with sufficient evidence to assure that the court will intervene and de-
tain the child. This presents an easy method for abdicating parental
responsibility when a child presents behavioral problems. Misapplica-
tion of the status offense jurisdiction also can occur when the court is
used by parents to punish their children.
Practical problems in court administration also are part of the con-
sideration for abolition of juvenile court jurisdiction over status offend-
ers. The problems of overcrowded court calendars and tremendous
pressure on court time found in adult courts exist in the juvenile courts
as well.85 Preoccupation with status offenses has resulted in heavily
overloaded juvenile courts, leaving judges and probation officers with
too little time and too few resources to deal adequately with the
juveniles who commit criminal acts. Removing status offense cases
from the purview of the juvenile court would lessen this burden signifi-
cantly. Moreover, by instituting alternatives to the courts' jurisdiction,
problems could be handled more immediately, at the onset of the crisis,
rather than after the passage of weeks or months during which attitudes
and positions have hardened.
86
Finally, status offense cases, far more than child neglect or crimi-
nal violation cases, present issues that are peculiarly in-suited for, and
not served by, legal analysis and judicial fact-finding. In addition, by
placing the family dispute in a court setting, the child and parents are
forced to assume undesirable adversary positions. While the judicial
system may be capable of determining whether a person committed a
given act, it is "incapable. . . of effectively managing, except in a very
gross sense, so delicate and complex a relationship as that between par-
83. Moreover, secure institutions housing criminal violators are necessarily geared to
the custodial demands of the worst of the inmates, and the treatment for which the unruly
child was committed is often nonexistent. See generally Morales v. Turman, 364 F. Supp.
166 (E.D. Tex. 1973); Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Nelson v.
Heyne, 355 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Ind. 1972), supplemental opinion, 355 F. Supp. 458, a f'd, 491
F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974); Note, Persons in Need of Supervision: Is There a Constitutional
Right to Treatment, 39 BROOKLYN L. REV. 624 (1973).
84. ASSEMBLY REPORT, supra note 2, at 14.
85. T. RUBIN, LAW AS AN AGENT OF DELINQUENCY PREVENTION 2 (1970) (prepared
for Delinquency Prevention Strategy Conference).
86. The juvenile court process is frequently plagued with delays. See C. SILBERMAN,
CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 309-70 (1978).
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ent and child." 87
For these reasons, serious consideration often has been given to
eliminating juvenile court jurisdiction over noncriminal conduct.
8 s
The removal of status offenses from the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court would seem to be a logical complement to the present trend to-
ward deinstitutionalizing status offenders.89 Status offenders constitute
a different group of youths than the juvenile criminal offenders. These
youths have violated no penal statutes and should not be treated as if
they had. The problems of these children are more representative of
personal and family difficulties.90 The need for alternative methods of
dealing with noncriminal youths is evident, 91 and the seriousness of the
87. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUND & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD 8 (1973).
88. The President's Crime Commission offered this solution in 1967. PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE
OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 228 (1967). Others have come to a similar conclusion, includ-
ing the National Council on Crime and Delinquency in 1970. See Policy Statement, Crimes
Without Victims, 17 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 129 (1971). See also Gonin, Section 601 Cali-
fornia Welfare and Institutions Code. A Need for a Change, 9 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 294
(1972), noting the Los Angeles Superior Court Special Committee on Judicial Reform rec-
ommendation that § 601 be eliminated. The Committee stated that § 601 "in effect permits
irresponsible parents, overworked or ineffective school personnel and agencies unable to
effectively collect evidence to establish parental neglect, to 'put a record' on a youngster
who, in most cases, is not the one primarily responsible for the activity involved. It is a
section ofttimes used against dependent and neglected children who are difficult to handle in
company with other dependent and neglected children. It is also used as a 'dealing' section
to encourage a plea where a delinquency conviction could not be sustained. The experience
of juvenile court judges has been that the intrusion of the court often accentuates and per-
petuates the family schism that is characteristic of the 601 case." Id. at 309.
89. Maine has virtually eliminated court jurisdiction over status offenders, placing the
responsibility for handling family conflicts and school problems on the family, school, and
government services. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 3701-04, 3803, 3891-A to -F
(Supp. 1978).
Utah requires that cases involving runaways or children beyond the control of their
parents or school be referred first to the division of family services; only by reference of a
specified agency can the matter be referred to the juvenile court. See UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 78-3a-1 to 78-3a-16.5 (1953 & Supp. 1979).
Virginia, Washington, Massachusetts, New Mexico and Florida also have barred or
limited substantially the placement of status offenders in jails, detention, or correctional
facilities. See, e.g., VA. CODE §§ 16.1-246, 16.1-249 (Supp. 1979).
90. Some types of behavior for which youth are brought into court under status offense
jurisdiction are considered normal and healthy by psychologists. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A.
FREUND & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 34 (1973).
91. Juvenile noncriminal misbehavior in Scotland and Sweden currently is handled
without court involvement. For a discussion of the unique system of juvenile justice in
Scotland, see Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: Innovations in Scotland, 12 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
61 (1974).
For a discussion of the arguments against the abolition of juvenile court jurisdiction
over status offenders, see Gregory, Juvenile Court Jurisdiction Over Noncriminal Misbehavior
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situation demands that a change be made soon.92
Proposed Alternatives For the Treatment of Status Offenders
The decriminalization of status offenses cannot be realized fully
unless the present treatment of noncriminal youths is changed. Non-
criminal youths are in need of services which can be administered more
effectively by non-coercive programs within the community than
through court adjudication. Recognition of noncriminal antisocial be-
havior as a manifestation of family and personal problems is a neces-
sary first step toward these types of changes and toward effective
rehabilitation of status offenders. 93 Successful rehabilitation requires a
shift away from the punishment imposed by juvenile courts and a move
toward the involvement of professionals trained to respond to family,
emotional, and school problems.
Many such alternatives to juvenile court jurisdiction have been
proposed, and some have been instituted. 94 Two proposals in particu-
lar deserve further discussion. The first alternative involves the estab-
lishment of community-based services, and the second involves the use
of advisory arbitration as an alternative to court adjudication.
Community-Based Youth Services: A Model
A community-based youth service which already has proven to be
a successful alternative to the treatment of status offenders can be
found at Perry Place. Perry Place is a community-home (also referred
to as a crisis resolution home) located in Oakland, California. 95
The Perry Place program is part of a new approach to status of-
fenders in Alameda County. Under the Alameda County program, sta-
tus offenders who otherwise would be routed through the juvenile court
The Argument Against Abolition, 39 OHIo ST. L.J. 242 (1978); Pabon, Changes in Juvenile
Justice: Evolution or Reform, NAT'L ASS'N Soc. WORKERS, November 1978, at 472.
92. This Note deals with possible alternative methods of dealing with juvenile non-
criminal misbehavior. It is important to realize, however, that to prevent juvenile misbehav-
ior effectively, the problem must be dealt with in its broader outlines, attacking the
conditions of society which underlie problems of youth. Society should be concerned
equally with the causes ofjuvenile problems, which go beyond the individual, arising from a
vast network of factors, including family, friends, and community. Efforts should be made
to reduce unemployment, improve housing and recreational facilities, involve youth in com-
munity activities, and the like. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 41-56.
93. Criminal behavior may also stem from family and personal problems. However, a
discussion of criminal behavior is beyond the scope of this Note.
94. See the discussion of Perry Place and advisory arbitration in notes 95-123 & accom-
panying text infra.
95. The Perry Place program was established prior to the enactment of AB 3121, with
funds from a grant ($1.5 million). The program is now run by the Children's Home Society
under a contract with the Alameda County Probation Department.
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process are taken to Perry Place. Perry Place is a large house in an
attractive residential part of Oakland, described as having a "homey,
nonprisonlike atmosphere." 96 The Perry Place house accomodates six
youngsters and a fulltime staff of professional counselors and para-pro-
fessionals trained to deal with the problems of youths.
The basic philosophy of Perry Place is that the juveniles brought
to the facility are deserving of care, understanding, respect, and consid-
eration. 97 Under this approach, "status offenders are no longer consid-
ered a juvenile justice problem. They are a social problem, and
counseling rather than arrest, is in order. '98 One of the cornerstones of
the operation of Perry Place is that a child should be responsible for his
or her conduct.99 The expectation of responsibility is a very important
component of the program. From the time a juvenile arrives, the child
must decide whether to discuss his or her situation with the staff. The
child has the responsibility to determine whether to stay at Perry
Place, 100 and whether to participate with his or her family in a counsel-
ing session. 10' The expectation of responsibility also assumes more
concrete manifestations. The child is expected to help in the prepara-
tion of meals, participate in housekeeping tasks, and behave toward
others in the home in a responsible and appropriate manner. More-
over, all of these changes generally are compressed into a short time
frame, because under present law a juvenile shall be released within
forty-eight hours if no court order has been obtained.
10 2
During this period family counseling sessions are arranged. With
the aid of family crisis counselors, the juvenile and the family meet to
resolve the juvenile's problem or the family conflict that precipitated
the crisis requiring the youth to be taken to Perry Place. Priority is
placed on resolving the crisis and returning the youth to the family
96. San Francisco Chronicle, Jan. 4, 1979, at 21, col. 4.
97. Interview with Mimi Levine, Director of Perry Place, in Oakland, California (Jan.
15, 1979). The discussion in the text about the program at Perry Place is based on this
interview with Ms. Levine.
98. San Francisco Chronicle, Jan. 4, 1979, at 21, col. 1.
99. Interview with Mimi Levine, Director of Perry Place, in Oakland, California (Jan.
15, 1979). The concept of responsibility bears noting for it permeates the alternatives to
juvenile court jurisdiction proposed in this Note. Responsibility for one's conduct is impor-
tant to both the use of voluntary community services and the use of mediation-arbitration.
See notes 116-17 & accompanying text infra.
100. Perry Place has a remarkably low "walk away" rate; only about 10% of the resi-
dents leave without permission. In contrast, in San Francisco, where status offenders are
kept in unlocked cottages at the juvenile hall, the walk away rate is approximately 25%. San
Francisco Chronicle, Jan. 4, 1979, at 21, col. 1.
101. Cf STANDARDS, supra note 39, § 4.2, at 52 (stating services ofjuvenile justice agen-
cies should be offered on a voluntary basis).
102. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 313 (West Supp. 1979).
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home.10 3 If such a return is determined not to be in the best interest of
the youth, family, or community, an attempt is made to locate an alter-
native voluntary placement' °4 for the youth, with the consent of the
parents. Voluntary placements generally are effectuated in the home of
a relative or family friend. When a voluntary placement is made, fol-
low-up efforts are made to ensure that the placement is the most appro-
priate alternative, and referrals are made to counseling services in the
hope that a family reconciliation can be achieved.
To complement the program at Perry Place, Alameda County has
developed a comprehensive range of social services which provide
needed help to both youths and parents. 0 5 This program includes cri-
sis intervention counseling 10 6 to deal with immediate and acute
problems, long-term counseling services, 0 7 referrals to other appropri-
ate community resources, and a foster home program.
Although no definite statistics exist as to the frequency of
reinvolvement with the juvenile justice system and the number of fam-
fly reconciliations, services outside the juvenile court system have
proved to be a feasible and realistic approach to the handling of non-
criminal misbehavior.'0 8 While many jurisdictions are struggling with
the attitude that nothing can be done with status offenders without the
authority to detain them, Perry Place demonstrates that "you don't
103. "The place for most children is with their families." STANDARDS, supra note 39,
§ 5.3, Commentary, at 56.
104. "Voluntary placement" means that the placement outside the family home must be
with the full accord of both the juvenile and the parents or guardian. In essence, voluntary
placement is a private matter between the parents and the child without public sanction. If
either objects to the placement, the placement becomes involuntary. With the Perry Place
program, a court petition is filed in Alameda County only when the involuntary placement
of a juvenile outside the family home is required.
105. See STANDARDS, supra note 39, § 4.1, at 52.
106. Id. § 4.3, at 53.
107. Id.
108. One of the primary concerns when abolishing juvenile court jurisdiction over status
offenders and instituting a comprehensive social services plan is the financial consequences.
This cost concern is especially relevant in view of the pressures of inflation and severe
budget cutbacks.
In a cost analysis study conducted in 1977, it was found that the costs of alternatives to
detention and correctional facilities were, with few exceptions, less than the per unit cost of
maintaining children in secure detention and correctional facilities. ARTHUR D. LITTLE,
INC., COST AND SERVICE IMPACTS OF DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION OF STATUS OFFENDERS IN
TEN STATES: RESPONSES TO ANGRY YOUTH 32 (1977).
In addition, many innovative programs can be developed that do not require expendi-
tures of large amounts of money for facilities and staff. Existing organizations and groups
often have resources, staff, and expertise that can be directed toward meeting the needs of
youth. Volunteer programs may also be instituted. See OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, FREE: YOUTH PROGRAMS THAT DON'T COST DOLLARS
(1978); OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, VOLUNTEER SERV-
IcES (1978).
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have to lock status offenders up to treat them."'' 0 9
Mediation-Arbitration
The process of third-party intervention, in the form of either medi-
ation, arbitration, or reconciliation, increasingly has been preferred as
an alternative to court litigation' ,0 in many dispute situations, ranging
from labor-management conflicts"'I and Indian land rights conflicts, ",
2
to minor misdemeanors' 13 and community disputes. 14 Recently, there
also have been significant attempts at mediation within the juvenile mi-
lieu. ' 15
Mediation is a process of intervention by a neutral third-party
who, without the power to make binding decisions, attempts to facili-
tate discussion among parties to a dispute and assist them in reaching a
mutual agreement. An extension of mediation, "media-
tion/arbitration," takes the third-party process one step further. The
dispute resolution effort begins with mediation, but if the parties are
unable to agree to a resolution of the problem, the third-party is em-
powered to render a binding decision to resolve the dispute.1 6 In arbi-
tration, the parties to the dispute, by agreement in advance, submit
issues to an abritrator for resolution with the understanding that the
arbitrator's decision will be final.
109. San Francisco Chronicle, Jan. 4, 1979, at 21, col. 4.
110. Similar processes for dispute resolution are used in other countries; for example,
the social conciliation courts in Poland and the public complaint boards in Sweden. For
discussions of the uses of mediation, arbitration, and conciliation, see Greenwald, CR.S.:
Dispute Resolution Through Mediation, 64 A.B.A.J. 1250 (1978); Spencer & Zammit, Media-
tion-Arbitration: A Proposal For Private Resolution of Disputes Between Divorced or Sepa-
rated Parents, 1976 DUKE L.J. 911 (1976); Note, Compulsory Judicial Arbitration in
California.- Reducing the Delay and Expense of Resolving Uncomplicated Civil Disputes, 29
HASTINGS L.J. 475 (1978). See also DeCecco & Richards, Civil War in the High Schools,
PSYCH. TODAY, November 1975, at 51 (proposing use of mediation to deal with high school
conflicts).
111. See generally F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS (3d ed.
1973).
112. See generally Ford Foundation, Mediating Social Conflict 11-13 (Apr. 14, 1978)
(draft) [hereinafter cited as Ford Foundation].
113. Id. at 23. See note 122 infra.
114. Ford Foundation, supra note 112, at 6.
115. Mediation is used to resolve inmate grievances in the California Youth Authority.
See Ford Foundation, supra note 112, at 19-22. Mediation is also used in Washington as the
first phase of a crisis intervention program for status offenders. Telephone interview with
Jeff Milligan, Oregon Council on Crime and Delinquency (Feb. 26, 1979).
116. However, in actual practice, mediators attempt to avoid the final step ofarbitration.
According to Manuel Orochena of the New York Institute for Mediation and Conflict Reso-
lution, in the over 250 cases he has mediated, he has resorted to arbitration only five times.
"I've always had the feeling that no agreement is going to work unless the parties agree to
it. . . . If you impose a resolution, they'll act as if a judge were making a decision. They go
out and commit the same offense." Ford Foundation, supra note 112, at 25.
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In considering the former two alternatives, mediation and media-
tion/arbitration,1 17 it seems clear that both of these third-party mecha-
nisms also might be applied successfully to situations involving juvenile
noncriminal misbehavior. The use of mediation would remove non-
criminal juveniles from the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts and place
the problems of youth and family with a nonjudicial body, where fam-
ily-oriented problems properly belong. The mediation process, unlike
the court process, would directly involve the juvenile and the family in
both the actual questions to be addressed and the resolution of the
problem. The parties, generally the child and the parents, would be
encouraged to take responsibility for the problem, which hopefully
would lead to a more genuine effort to resolve it.
The positive elements of mediation in a juvenile status offender
setting are that it would require a confrontation of the parent and child,
would allow for the participation of a neutral party, and would remove
the dispute from the impersonal and often unsatisfactory proceedings
of the juvenile courts. In contrast to the courts' often mechanical treat-
ment of status offenders, mediation would enable the parties to explore
alternative solutions to the problems of the child and family, and to
design a solution suited to their specific needs. More importantly, the
juvenile would be spared the attendant stigma and frustration of a
court experience.I" As a practical matter, the use of mediation as an
alternative to juvenile court adjudication would reduce the court
caseload, allowing the court more time to devote to criminal viola-
tors." 19 The mediation process also could serve as a catalyst toward the
use of community services by the juvenile.
In Rochester, New York, the County Youth Bureau utilizes medi-
tion in its Juvenile Diversion Program, 20 an alternative to the Family
Court. The Program serves youths who have been petitioned to appear
in Family Court for such incidents as truancy, minor cases of malicious
mischief, fighting, vagrancy, loitering, trespassing, and alcohol related
violations. The goal of the program is to foster family participation in
mediation to help children and their families find a consensual and
practical resolution to their problems. The mediation process is
designed to ensure that the family receives personal attention and help,
117. Hereinafter, mediation is used as an inclusive term, encompassing mediation and
mediation/arbitration.
118. As noted in Ford Foundation, supra note 112, at 23: "If you get him [a juvenile] in
a court. . . he's marked. . . forever and you've probably lost him to the whole system. If
you can get him into a private mediation system you can maintain his status as a noncrimi-
nal." See notes 72-84 & accompanying text supra for a discussion of the stigma and frustra-
tion accompanying a court experience.
119. See note 85 & accompanying text supra.
120. See Rochester-Monroe County Youth Bureau, Project Concept (unpublished fund-
ing request of mediation agency on file with The Hastings Law Journal).
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rather than to attach a stigma of delinquency to the youth as would a
court appearance.
The mediation "hearing" consists of the youth, the parents, and a
neutral party called a panelist.' 2 ' Prior to the hearing, the youth and
family meet with a counselor to prepare for the mediation procedure
and to discuss specific problems and concerns. The counselor acts as a
resource person for the panelist and participants during the hearing,
assisting in referring the youth and family to appropriate agencies and
advising them of the need for further counseling. The counselor also
meets with the family three weeks after the hearing to assess the results
of the agreement and monitor the implementation of the decision.'
22
The Rochester program and other court diversion programs are
examples of how mediation can be used as an alternative to juvenile
court in dealing with noncriminal youth. Utilizing mediation would
require that the juvenile and the family identify problems and seek so-
lutions that they implement. The ultimate responsibility in such cases
would lie with the family unit to explore and find solutions for their
own lives. In contrast to the coercive intervention of the court, which
often polarizes parents and children and encourages parents to abdicate
their function to the court, mediation would serve to develop controls
and means within the family for the resolution of conflicts: "It is within
the family that the child must learn to curb his desires and accept rules
that define the time, place, and circumstances under which highly per-
sonal needs may be satisfied in socially acceptable ways."'
t23
Authorized Court Intervention
Recognizing that status offenders are noncriminal youths who suf-
fer from personal and family problems, treatment afforded such youths
should be flexible and fashioned to meet the specific needs of these
children and their families. Rather than punitive treatment, alternative
121. When a criminal offense is involved, the victim also may attend the mediation
hearing.
122. See Rochester-Monroe County Youth Bureau, Project Concept (unpublished fund-
ing request of mediation agency on file with The Hastings Law Journal). Court diversion
programs exist in other cities also, for example, in San Francisco, Cleveland, Philadelphia,
Boston, Akron, and New York City. See Ford Foundation, supra note 112, at 24. These
programs are not directed solely to the diversion of juvenile disputes. In San Francisco,
minor criminal incidents and community disputes can be solved through the Community
Board Program. See generally Los Angeles Times, Mar. 30, 1978, pt. 4, at 1, col. 1; Pam-
phlet, Community Board Program (on file with The Hastings Law Journal). Under the
Community Board Program, five member panels, selected by the community, hear disputes,
help clarify problems, and discuss ways to resolve the problem. The Program staff and com-
munity cooperate to see that resolutions are carried out. Pamphlet, Community Board Pro-
gram (on file with The Hastings Law Journal).
123. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 45.
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methods such as counseling, arbitration, and non-secure homes should
be considered fully before traditional solutions are utilized.
Where a child is not amenable to alternative forms of treatment,
the juvenile court, as a last resort, can reassert jurisdiction over the
child by utilizing its dependency jurisdiction. For example, California
Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 provides that the juvenile
court has jurisdiction over any person under eighteen years of age
"[w]ho is in need of proper and effective parental care or control and
has no parent or guardian, or has no parent or guardian willing to exer-
cise or capable of exercising such care or control."'
24
Most juveniles who would have fallen within the status offense ju-
risdiction also would fall within the provisions of section 300, thus al-
lowing the court to intervene as a last resort. While historically use of
section 300 has been almost exclusively for pre-adolescent minors who
are inadequately cared for or abused, such limited use is the result of
established practice rather than statutory limitations.125 Most status of-
fenders could be processed under the court's dependency jurisdiction;
no matter how a runaway, incorrigible, or unruly teenager is described,
it could be said that their parents are either unwilling or unable to con-
trol them.12 6
Conclusion
Juvenile court jurisdiction over noncriminal youths has not suc-
ceeded in rehabilitating youths or bringing justice to children. There-
fore, serious consideration must be given to the elimination of this
jurisdiction, if the problems of youths are to be dealt with effectively.
The proposals set forth in this Note, community-based services
and advisory arbitration, are possible alternatives to juvenile court ju-
risdiction. Perhaps these services, administered outside the formal ju-
venile justice system, will prove to be a step toward more effective
rehabilitation of noncriminal youths.
124. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300(a) (West Supp. 1979).
125. ASSEMBLY REPORT, supura note 2, at 33.
126. This is not to mean that all status offense cases should be processed under the
court's dependency jurisdiction, but only that they could be processed if necessary.
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